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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
DONALD RAY~fl1~R AND MluLERS' 
~lUTli1\L INSURANCE ASSO~CIA­
TION, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
Hl-LIXr~ TRANSPORT, INC., 




STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CAS·E 
This is a second suit, filed after a trial and judg~ 
ment for plaintiff in the first law suit, seeking to recover 
additional automobile property damages represented by 
the subrogation interest of plaintiff insurer, who had 
elected, prior to the first suit, not to have their interests 
included in the first suit. 
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DISPOSITION IN T,HE LOWER COURT 
Based on stipulated facts, and written Memoranda 
' judgment was entered for defendant. 
The facts are stipulated. and plaintiff's attempt to 
enlarge, analyze, and argue the facts in his "STATE-
MENT OF: F AC,TS" is both misleading and erroneous. 
For the convenience of the Court and in the interest 
of accuracy, we quote the Stipulation of Facts (R-20-22) 
as well as the pertinent exhibits referred to therein. 
STIP'ULATION 
,Comes now the plaintiffs by and through their at-
torney Glen M. Hatch and the defendant by and through 
it~ ~ttorney, L. E. Midgley and with respect to the above-
entitled cause, stipulate that if proper witnesses were 
called and testified at the time of trial, the following 
facts would be found. 
1. That defendant at all times pertinent to this 
matter, was insured for public liability and property 
damage liability by Central Casualty Company, an in-
surance company of Illinois, authorized to transact busi-
ness in Utah. The Policy of Insurance, Exhibit "A" 
is attached. 
2. Homer Bray Service, Inc., of Evanston, Illinois, 
was the General Agent for said insurance company and 
Curtis and Brandley of Sa:lt Lake City, Utah were the 
local agents. 
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3 
3. That said insurance was in force on May 17th, 
l9ti0 "·hen planitiff Donald Raymer was involved in an 
~ccident with defendant's truck. 
4. That the plaintiff, Donald Raymer, on the date 
llf said accident, was the owner of a 1960 Buick which 
was insured 'vith Miller's Mutual Insurance Association, 
an insurance company of Illinois; that said collision in-
~urance policy provided $50.00 deductible collision cover-
age; that the automobile sustained damages rendering 
said automobile a total loss ; that Donald Raymer paid 
$50.00 of said loss and Millers' Mutual Insurance Associ-
ation paid $2,()42.00, the reasonable value of said vehicle, 
after credit of salvage value being $2,692.00. 
Plaintiff Donald Raymer suffered injuries in the 
aforesaid accident and retained attorney Glen M. Hatch, 
to represent him for the recovery of said damages as a 
result of said injuries and his expenses, including his 
$50.00 deductible. 
5. Attorney Hatch, prior to filing suit, corresponded 
with Millers' Mutual Insurance Association, notifying 
said insurance company that he was about to commence 
suit against the defendant, and asked if the claim of 
Millers' Mutual Insurance Association for their subro-
gation interest should be included in said suit. 
fi Millers' Mutual then wrote to Homer Bray Serv-
ice, Inc. (Exhibit "B")• and received a reply, (Exhibit 
"C")••. 
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•Exhibit "B" (R-20) 
February 17, 1961 
Homer Bray Service, Incorporated 
P. 0. Box 1111 
Evanston, Illinois 
Gentlemen: 
Attention: E. C. J obe 
Vice President 
Re : Donald M. Raymer 
Policy No.: 4235 0847 
D/A: May 17,1960 
Subrogation Claim: 05 1434 
Your File : 60361 
We understand you are representing the Central 
·Casualty Company who provides liability coverage under 
their policy A-12'49·3 for the Hi-Line Transportation 
Company, owners of the other vehicle involved in the 
captioned accident. We understand also that both our 
insured and his wife have presented injury claims as a 
result of this accident and that you haven't yet· been 
able to dispose of these injury cases. 
Mr. Raymer's 1960 Buick was totally demolished in 
this accident and we have made a· fairly substantial 
payment to him under our collision coverage. Our in-
vestigation indicates the Hi-Line Transportation Com-
pany vehicle 'vas responsible for this accident and we 
are therefore now looking to the Central Casualty Com-
pany for reimbursement covering our collision payment. 
We would accordingly appreciate it if you will kindly 
advise us whether Central Casualty will give due con-
sideration to our subrogation clain1 after they have 
disposed of our insureds' injury clailns. In the absence 
of some assurance that Central Casualty \viii consider 
our subrogation claiin after the other cases are out of 
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the way we will naturally be forced to take other action 
to prot~ct our interests. 
Sincerely, 
s/ J. W. Kelsey 
Casualty Claims D·epartment. 
• •Exhibit "C" (R-28) 
February 22,"1961 
(Dictated 2-20-61) 
Mr. J. W. Kelsey 
Casualty Claims Department · 
~tillers' ~lutual Insurance Association 
320 Easton Street 
Alton, Illinois 
Re ~File No. 60-361 
Insured: Hi-Line Transport 
Your File: Subrogation Claim 05 1434 
Clauuant: Donald M. Raymer 
Dear Mr. Kelsey: 
This will acknowedge receipt of your letter of February 
17, 1961 and we shall appreciate receiving photostatic 
copy of your proof of loss together with draft in pay-
ment. 
You are correct. We have not been able to dispose of 
the injury claims and when they are out of the way we 
will certainly be more than happy to give your subroga-
tion claiin consideration. 
Thanking you for your cooperation, I am 
Sincerely yours, 
HOMER BRAY SE.RVIC~E, 
INC. 
E. C. JOBE 
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7. Based on the above correspondence, 'Millers' 
Mutual wrote attorney Hatch advising that their subro-
gation interest should not be included in the lawsuit. 
8. Attorney Hatch filed suit in the District Court 
of the ·Third Judicial Ditsrict In and For Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, entitled Donald Raymer et al 
Plaintiffs vs. Hi-Line Transport Inc., Civil No. 130117 
in which plaintiff Raymer prayed for recvery of his 
$50.00 deductible as well as other Special Damages and 
General Damages for his personal injuries. 
9. Trial of the aforesaid law suit in Salt Lake 
County was held on October 3rd to 5th, 1961 which 
resulted in a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff Raymer, 
which judgment was fully paid and satisfied by Central 
Casualty Company. 
10. Neither Homer Bray Service, Inc., nor Central 
Casualty Company at any time notified defendant Hi-
Line ~Transport Inc., of any negotiations or arrange-
ments concerning the subrogation interest of Millers' 
Mutual Insurance Association. 
11.· The understanding evidenced by the corres-
pondence between Central Casualty Company and Mil-
lers' Mutual Insurance Association was that after the 
conclusion of the personal injury action, in the event 
plaintiff prevailed, Central Casualty would pay to ~fil­
lers' Mutual the amount claimed by Millers' Mutual 
under their subrogation rights. 
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12. That the above understanding is based on a cus-
torn nnd practice between insurance companies generally, 
in fuetual situations where liability appears clear, for 
the reasons : 
(a) rrhe subrogation company saves attorneys fees 
and <'Osts of collection. 
(b) The Liability Company is thereby able to keep 
the special damages in the personal injury action re-
duet\d by the extent of the omitted subrogation interest. 
(<·) Reciprocity and comity between companies, in-
asinuch as in a later case, where the interests are 
reversed, the benefits may be reversed. 
13. After termination of the personal injury action 
in the Third Judicial District and before filing the pres-
ent la,vsuit, Central Casualty Company went into re:.. 
reivership and is now in receivership and the office of 
Liquidator of Central Casualty Company was tendered 
the defense of the present lawsuit, which defense was 
refused. (Exhibit "E") 
14. That no release, or other document was executed 
by Plaintiff Raymer, specifically reserving the cause 
of action represented by the subrogation interest of 
Millers' Mutual. 
15. That the collision on May 17th, 1960 was proxi-
Inately caused by the negligence of the defendant; that 
this plaintiff, Donald Raymer 'vas free from contribu-
tory negligence; that Defendant's negligence proximately 
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caused the above mentioned damage to the Buick auto-
mobile of Plaintiff Donald Raymer. 
Dated this 28th day of F·ebruary 19'63. 
Js/ GLEN M. H~TCH 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
jsj L. E. MIDGLEY 
Attorney for Defendant 
POINT ONE 
THE PRIOR LAW SUIT IS RES JUDICATA, 
AND THE PRESENT SUIT IS BARRED AS AN AT-
TEMPT TO SPLIT A CAUSE OF ACTION. 
The qusetion involved in this appeal may be stated 
as follows: 
MAY AN INSURER, WITH FULL KNO·WLEDGE 
o~F IT1S INSURED·'S SUIT FOR PERSONAL INJUR-
IE~S AND PROPERTY DAMAGE, ELEC'T NO'T TO 
HAvE· IITS SUBROGAT,ION IN'TERESTS IN-
CLUDED IN ·THE SUIT BE:CAUSE OF A 8ECRET 
AGREEME·N'T TO BE PAID AT A L~TER D'ATE 
BY THE D·EFE.NDANT'S INSURER, FILE A SEC-
OND· SUI'T AGAINS'T' THE DEFE,NDAN'T PERSON-
ALLY, WHEN ·THE SOLE REASON FOR THE 
BREACH O~F SAID AGREE,MENIT BY DEFENDANT 
INS~URER wAS 1T'HE F AC'T 'THAT IT; BECAME IN-
SOLVENT. 
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It is erystal clear that in Utah, a single cause of 
action may not be split, to permit two suits. 
In Johansen v. Cudahy Packing Co., 107 Utah 114, 
1:">~ P2d 98, after citing several jurisdictions holding with 
the rule in Utah, states, at 152 P2d 103; 
"These cases proceed upon the theory that 
the insured is the trustee for the insurer and that 
the third party has a right not to have the cause 
of action against him split up so that he is com-
pelled to defend two or more actions. ·This split-
ting of the cause of action is avoided by having 
the suit brought in the name of the insured for 
the benefit of himself as trustee for the insur-
ance carrier. The principle of law is noted in 
Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. U.P.&R.G.R. Go., 44 
utah 26, 137 p. 653." 
This holding was again upheld, contrary to plain-
tiff's brief, in Cederloff v. Whited (1946) ilO Utili 45, 
169 P2d 771, at pg. 780; 
"As pointed out in the Johansen case, 
(supra), even though the insurance company is 
subrogated to a part of the claim of the plaintiff, 
against the defendant, that does not create an-
other cause of action and there can only be one 
suit to recove'r on that cause of a.ction.'' (Empha-
sis added) 
See also: Madsen v. Madsen, 72 Utah 96, 269 Pac. 
132. Badger v. Badger, 69 Utah 293, 
25·4 Pac. 784. Sniith v. Lenzi, 74 Utah 
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362, 179 Pac. 896. Chesney v. District 
Court of Salt Lake County, 99 l;tah 
513 ( 1941), 108 P·2d. 514. 
In the c·ederloff case, the defendant contended that 
the plaintiff, (insured), could only recover the deductible, 
the balance having been assigned to plaintiff's insurer, 
inasmuch as the defendant feared he could be again sued 
in the subrogation action. 'This co~tention failed. 
Bancroft Code Pleading, ·Ten Year Supplement, Sec. 
384, Pg. 1512. characterizes the rule against splitting 
as the "settled policy of the law"; and at S.ec. 289, Pg. 
1512 states further, 
"The rule against splitting a cause of action 
cannot be avoided by making partial assign-
ments." 
The above Utah holdings are supported by the great 
weight of authority. 
Joyce v. Murphy Land Co., 35 Idaho 549, 208 Pac. 
241. Iowa National v. Huntley, 78 Wyoming 380, 
32 8P2'd 569. 29A Am. Jur. Sec. 1720, pg. 800. 
62 ALR2d 977. 
Even in Ohio, where the assignee is held to have a 
separate cause- of action under some circumstances, the 
Utah holding is upheld where the insurer had knowledge 
of the first suit. 
We are accused, in plaintiff's brief, of misquoting 
Spargur v. Dayton Power and Light Co., 7 Ohio Ops 2d 
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138, 15~ ~.E.~d 918, \vhich accusation is obviously erron-
mao~. \VhilP a reading of the case by the Court will 
settle this ~ide controversy, we feel constrained to defend 
ourst•lvl\~ herein. 
lT nder Ohio procedure, four suits were filed as a 
l'P~ult of an explosion, one for personal injuries, one for 
medical expenses, and two for property damage to per-
sonalty u.nd realty, and the insurers joined in the prop-
erty daruagP suits. While these cases were. pending, the 
Ohio Supreme Court announced a new rule preventing 
tlw splitting of a cause of action, but allowing an as-
signee to sue separately. !Two of the four cases were 
tried (personal injury and medical), and judgment was 
rendered in favor of several defendants. Those defend-
ants then moved to dismiss the two property damage 
cases as res judicata, estoppel by judgment, and splitting . 
. .:\ t page 927, the Court finds : 
"The four motions of the defendants ... for 
judgment on the pleadings is sustained ... " 
At page 925 the Ohio Court states : 
.. The Court finds that the assignee of a claim 
for property damage is in privity with the as-
signor and is bound by a final adjudication ad-
verse to or in favor of the injured assignor in 
a personal injury action." · 
A. reading of the case reveals that the Ohio c·ourt 
based its findings on the law of privity, and estoppel. 
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As to privity, the :Court states, at page 922: 
"Privity is a succession of interest or rela-
tionship to the same thing whether created by 
deed, by contract, by other act, or by operation 
of law. Privity is dependent upon a succession 
in interest. Hence, one who has succeeded to an 
estate or interest is to that extent in privity with 
his successor." 
Page 924: 
"·The rule of privity ... extends to the sound 
rule of public policy of avoiding vexacious liti-
gation. where the relationship of privity exists 
prior to th.e commencement of the action." 
"In the -usual situation privity arises upon 
paym.ent to the insured, at which time the insurer 
acquires a legal or equitable interest in an "in-
divisible" cause of action. ·The insurer's interest 
is derived from· and in privity with the· insured 
and what he receives is not an interest in litiga-
tion, so as to make him a technical "privy" to a 
pending action, but a portion of a single claim 
which is no better than his predecessor possessed. 
If a man bought the wrong half of a horse he 
should not complain what his predecessor does 
with the other half, nor should his predicament 
force the courts to decide twice who should feed 
it with possibly contrary and embarrassing re-
sults. The failure to apply estoppel to the as-
signee in the insurance field has produced equally 
absurd situation.s~ 
As to estoppel, the Court states at Pag~ 927, after 
fully reviewing the law, 
~'here, as in practically all such situations, 
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the assignees \vere fully aware of the pendency 
of the actions by the injured parties. The assign-
ees had a right to participate in their assignors' 
actions and having failed to exercise that right 
th~y tnuy not co1nplain irresp~ctive of the out-
rome of the principal cases. 
The OhiQ Courts, however, have unnecessarily (we 
fct'l) inereascd their own difficulties, by holding that 
tlw det'Pndant can interplead the insurer; that the insurer 
has a separate cause of action; that a single cause may 
not be split: and that an insurer who does not enter 
into its in~ured's suit to protect its subrogation inter-
est~, is estopped from bringing the separate cause of 
action. 
Thi~ confusion is reviewed in an excellent opinion 
by a lo,ver court of Ohio, citing many cases in Appel-
lant's Brief, in Dubose v. Lowe, 189 NE2'd 923 . 
.. The problem ... of the effect of a judgment 
(on an insurer's subrogation rights) have plagued 
Ohio Courts for some time." 
HDespite the augustness of the authority, 
this Court finds the rule (permitting a second 
suit by the insurer) unnecessarily broad. It can-
not be reconciled with the historic and logical 
basis for the single cause of action rule ... that 
a tort feasor should not be harassed with a multi-
plicity of suits. Literally read, the Supreme 
Court's language . . . could mean that if the in-
jured party had had several insurance companies 
... the tort feasor could be subjected to separate 
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suits by the injured party and by each of the 
subrogated insurance companies ... very possibly 
with inconsistent results." 
_ "
1The issue should be determined on the basis 
of knowledge." 
In General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 
v. Sircey, 354 Mich. 478, 93 N.W.2d 315, the facts are 
squarely in point with the case at bar. Auto Owner's 
Ins. Co. insured Sircey for collision. Sircey sued for 
his personal injuries, but not including the insurer's sub-
rogation interest. Auto Owners knew of the litigation, 
but did not intervene or join because of the receipt 
of the following letter from defendant's insurer, General 
Accident: 
"Until some disposition has been made of the 
injury claims, we can make no commitment as to 
your subrogation claim. 
When the injury claims are out of the way, we 
shall be pleased to discuss this matter with you 
further.'' 
Jury verdict was against Sircey, no cause for action, 
in the personal injury action, and Auto Owner's denied 
the subrogation claim of General Accident, who then 
brought the above suit. 
- The Michigan Court upheld the lower ·Court's dis-
missal, saying: 
"Appellant did not request a waiver of the 
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def(·nse of split cause of action, and neither ap-
pellee nor Auto Owner's agreed to a waiver. 
Appellee did not request appellant to delay in 
partaking its subrogation claim. Appellant's 
claim of waiver because of correspondence is not 
sustained by the record.'' 
Plaintiff, in its Brief, attempts to explain away 
thl~ ·"'irccy case, (supra), by stating that case was in 
law, and not equity. In the later case of Flanary v. 
RestTVC 1 nsurance Company1 364 Mich. 73, 110 NW 2d 
tiiO, ( 1961), The Court States : 
HAppellant's claim that the c·ourt erred in 
not transferring the case to Equity has not only 
been answered by this opinion but, also, by previ-
ous decisions of this ·Court, and further discus-
sion on this point would be an imposition on bench 
and bar." 
In the Flanary case, plaintiff sued his collision 
earrier, Reserve. He also filed suit No. 2, for personal 
injuries only, and this suit was settled while the suit 
~o. 1 \vas pending. Reserve moved to dismiss suit 
Xo. 1, on the ground of splitting. Reserve did not 
know of the personal injury suit, or the settlement, until 
aftt'r settlen1ent. 
The opinion states; in ruling for the insurer: 
"In settling, plaintiff precluded himself from 
thereafter taking the position that he had been 
paid ~nly for personal injuries and suing Fenton 
f~r .his car loss. In so doing he also precluded 
lus Insurer . . . from so doing." 
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Sibson v. Roberts Express, Inc. (1962,) 104 NH 192, : 
182 A2d 449, follows the great majority of cases in 
refusing to allow a second suit by an insurer who re-
fused to protect their interests in their insured's per-
sonal injury suit, saying: 
"The agreed facts establish that the insurer's . 
conduct was deliberately chosen with knowledge 
of the pending suit." 
In accord: Coniglio v. Wyoming Valley Fire Ins. Co., 
3-37 Mich. 38, 59 NW2d 7 4. 
POINT TWO 
PLAINTIFF INSURER IS ESTOPPED BY ITS 
ACTIONS FROM BRINGING THIS LAW SUIT. 
'The rule against splitting, of course has its excep-
tions where the defendant consents, or where the plain-
tiff did not enter the first suit "by accident, excusable 
neglect, mistake or fraud of the adversary, and without 
fault of the pleader ... " Bancroft Code Pleading, 
(supra) Sec. 389, pg. 1516. None of the above exceptions 
are present in this case. 
The appellant must have tongue in cheek when it 
claims that it was mislead into electing not to enter 
the tort action, or that after all, Homer Bray was acting 
as agent for Hi-Line. By so claiming, the agreement 
stated in the stipulation must be reWlorded, and so must 
the letters between the two insurance companies. 
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Par. 11 of the Stipulation of Facts says: 
"The understanding ... was that ... Central 
Casualty would pay to Miller's Mutual ... " 
Hi-Line knew absolutely nothing of this arrange-
n1ent. Does .Appellant now want this Court to find that 
Central Casualty actually agreed that Hi-Line personally 
would pa.y the claim, when Hi-Line had insurance cov-
erage 1 Look at the Millers' letter to Homer Bray: 
H ••• we are ... now looking to Central Cas-
ualty Company for reimbursement ... " 
.. . . . kindly advise us whether Central 'Cas-
ualty \vill give due consideration to our subroga-
t. 1 . " 10n c rum .•. 
.. In the absence of some assurance that Cen-
tral Casualty will consider o~r subrogation claim 
t 
" 
... e c. 
Furthermore, Central Casualty had, no authority to 
bind Hi-Line to personal liability without its knowledge 
and consent. 
Hilker r. Western Auto Ins. Co. 204 Wis. 1, 231 
X.\V. 257. 
''The Power of settlement given the insurer 
cannot be used fo~ the p-qrposes of fraud or op-
pression . . . the power conferred must not be 
exercised in bad faith." 
.. The rule is fundamental that a person may 
not act as the agent of another where his inter-
ests are adverse to those of his principal, without 
the full knowledge and consent of his principaL" 
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·The agreement by Millers' with Central. was solely 
for the benefit of the insurance companies (Stipulation r. 
par. 12), and of absolutely no benefit to Hi-Line. By ... 
that agreement, Millers' saved attorney's fees and costs ·:~: 
of court. The Receivership of Central Casualty must 
not have been more of a surprise to ·Millers' than Hi-
Line, and Millers' effort to. transfer their bad bargain 
to defendant should not be countenanced. 
". . . the agreed facts establish that the in-
surer's conduct was deliberately chosen with 
knowledge of the pending suit." Sibson v. Roberts 
Exprses, Inc. (N.H.) supra. 
Millers' Mutual, like all insurance companies, are 
manned by competent adjusters and attorneys, and the 
fears expressed in plaintiff's Brief over the difficulties 
the companies might face in subrogation actions if tort-
feasors are not to be subjected to several suits, can 
easily be solved. 
But be that as it may, that is not the proble~ pre-
sented in this case. We can certainly allay appellant's 
fears. on future situations where they are invited to join 
in their insured's suit. Our legal advise is to either 
1. .Join in the suit, and pay a pro-rata share of 
the costs and attorneys fees. 
2. ~secure a binding agreement from the defend-
ant's insurer, and abide by the agreement, but 
first get a financial report. 
3. If it is desired to file a separate tort action, 
get a written consent from the defendant per-
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sonally, waiving his rights not to be harrassed 
twice by the same cause of action. 
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment en-
tered in favor of Defendant should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LO·UIS E. MID·GLEY 
Attorney for Defendant-
Respondent 
415 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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